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ANALYSIS OF ARMY CONTRACTING OFFICER 






This project provides a review and analysis of procurement fraud committed by Army 
Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), assesses the subsequent Army response, examines 
the behavioral model behind the Gansler Commission on fraud, and identifies the 
elements of a contingency environment that are conducive to fraud. Case analysis of 
procurement fraud is presented to illustrate the types of fraud that are committed and 
provide a basis of procurement fraud.  Based on the research findings, the author 
highlights the ineffectiveness and shortcomings of the current COR training program for 
the purpose of providing education and training recommendations to the Army 
acquisition workforce. 
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The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught the Department of Defense 
(DoD), and particularly the United States Army, lessons in many areas, one of which is 
the need for surveillance and oversight of contractor’s performance.  The contracting 
process in the contingency operations is multifaceted and includes cumbersome functions 
that provide major sources of support to the warfighter on the battlefield.  Prior to these 
two wars, the majority of wartime contracting actions involved simplified acquisition 
procedures that are “low dollar threshold items with little complexity and minor 
construction” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 26).  However, these procedures have now evolved 
to include the procurement of complex services, and major construction efforts and 
operation in a joint environment.  This dramatic transition requires contracting personnel 
to function in a complex environment, often while exposed to life-threatening danger and 
under pressure to meet deadlines—in addition to adapting to the cultural norms of the 
host country.  Contracting personnel must learn and adapt to new contracting procedures, 
practices, regulations and innovative technologies while fulfilling the urgent requirements 
of uniformed personnel on the battlefield.  Numerous reports from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), and 
other oversight agencies have documented shortcomings across the procurement 
continuum, including requirement identification, contracting, payment and funds control, 
equipment receipt, property accountability, and surveillance and oversight of the contract 
(GAO, 2010).  The GAO and DoD IG began reporting formally on those areas, 
categorized as high-risk in the wartime contracting process, in order to reduce 
procurement weaknesses in government operations that were vulnerable to fraud, waste, 
and abuse or mismanagement. 
The Army is faced with a myriad of challenges to effectively and efficiently 
conduct coordinated contracting operations that meet the U.S. Central Command 
Commander’s objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, while keeping pace with dramatic 
changes in the austere environment.  In addition, the Army needs to balance the increased 
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reliance on contractors with work done by Soldiers to provide operational supports in 
contingencies and assist with the contracting process.  The Army is aware of systemic 
issues in the contracting process, as well as the deficiencies in the procurement integrity 
framework, which have resulted in fraud investigations and convictions of contracting 
personnel, including Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs).  According to 
Secretary of the Army Pete Geren in a statement on November 1, 2007, “The Army 
acquisition workforce has not been properly sized, trained, structured, or empowered to 
meet the needs of our warfighters, in major expeditionary operations”  (Gansler, 2007, p. 
2). He added, “We also need to do a better job in training our commanders on their 
responsibilities for requirements definition and contractor performance” (McMahon & 
Sheftick, 2007).  Of the procurement fraud investigations involving Army contracting 
personnel in Operations Iraqi/Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), 23 percent indicate 
deficiencies with the Army’s existing procurement integrity framework  (Fontaine & 
Nagl, 2010, p. 17). 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 
This project aims to capture lessons learned from the Gansler Commission 
recommendations on the requirements for the COR program and instances of 
procurement fraud committed by Army CORs in OIF/OEF.  This may provide Army 
acquisition leaders with some objective guidance, based on these lessons, for 
incorporation in development of COR training plans in an effort to reduce future 
procurement integrity violations in contingency operations.  Reducing instances of 
procurement fraud directly impacts the appropriate utilization of taxpayer funding and the 
operational readiness of the warfighter, as well as enhances the reputation and standing of 
the Army. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This project provides a review and analysis of the procurement fraud committed 
by Army CORs during OIF/OEF, assesses the subsequent Army response, examines the 
behavioral model of fraud behind the Gansler Commission Report, and identifies the  
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elements of a wartime environment that are conducive to fraud.  In addition, a case 
analysis of procurement fraud is presented to illustrate the types of procurement fraud 
committed by Army CORs.   
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Literature reviews were conducted in the area of procurement fraud, specifically 
in wartime operations, via applicable GAO and DoD IG reports, in addition to the 
Gansler Commission report.  The author examined the training requirements for CORs in 
contingency operations courses offered by Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and 
the Army’s training programs, and other educational courses that focused on contingency 
operations for CORs—such as CLM 003 overview of acquisition ethics, CLC 106 COR 
with mission focus, CLC 222 COR resident training course and CLC 206 COR in a 
contingency environment—to identify how CORs are educated on the subject of fraud to 
prepare them for their critical roles in the procurement process (DAU, 2010b).  In 
addition, the author analyzed the OIF/OEF procurement fraud data and reviewed the 
Army’s response to the problems brought to light.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
The project includes five chapters.  Chapter I is an introduction that provides a 
background on contingency operations.  This chapter describes the objectives, scope and 
methodology for conducting the research.  Chapter II, Wartime Contracting, presents 
information on contracting in a wartime environment, the changes that have taken place 
over the past decade, and the crucial role contracting plays in the reconstruction efforts.  
This chapter also provides factors that contribute to procurement fraud and the Gansler 
Commission recommendations.  Chapter III, Procurement Fraud in OIF/OEF, describes 
the Fraud Triangle—a model used to detect and deter fraud, and to understand why 
people commit fraud—and presents some examples of procurement fraud cases 
committed by Army CORs.  Chapter IV, Contracting Officer Representative Training and 
Education, discusses the education, skill and knowledge requirements of CORs, as well 
as the ethical and statutory framework.  Chapter V, Conclusion and Recommendations, 
concludes the research and discusses whether the current education and training program 
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for CORs can be improved upon, based on the Gansler Commission recommendations as 
well as other studies.  This chapter also provides manning and resource recommendations 
for the Army and other areas for further research. 
F. SUMMARY 
Systemic issues and dramatic changes in wartime contracting, combined with an 
increased number of investigations leading to convictions of procurement fraud in 
OIF/OIF, have compelled the Department of Defense and the Army to examine the 
existing wartime contracting practices, procedures and trainings.  Based on literature 
reviews from sources such as the GAO and DoD IG reports, in addition to the Gansler 
Commission report, recommendations are suggested to enhance the current wartime 
contracting process, emphasize additional education and hands-on training, and fill gaps 
in the warfighter’s capabilities.  The end results will be to reduce future procurement 
fraud, waste and abuse, and above all, demonstrate to the public that the Army’s CORs 
and acquisition workforce are able to efficiently and effectively perform their duties 
during contingency operations.   
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II. CONTRACTING IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
A. ARMY EXPEDITIONARY CONTRACTING 
Expeditionary contracting has become more complex and demanding, and faces 
ongoing challenges.  The Department of Defense (DoD) spends hundreds of billions of 
dollars each fiscal year on contracts to acquire goods and services to support military 
operations in the full spectrum of armed conflict and peace support operations (PSO), 
humanitarian assistance (HA), or natural disasters, both domestic and overseas.   A 
myriad of policies, procedures, rules and practices are in place to contract for goods and 
services from suppliers that are vital to sustain the warfighters in the fast-paced and 
changing battlefield.  Wartime contracting provides services and goods in support of the 
warfighter in austere environments and overseas locations, whether a declared or a non-
declared contingency exists.   
A declaration contingency has statutory basis under Title 10 U.S.C.13 (a), which 
states that  
A declared contingency may be designated by the Secretary of Defense 
when members of the armed forces may become involved in military 
actions against an enemy of the United States, and/or declared by the 
President or the Congress when members of the uniformed forces are 
called on active duty under Title 10 U.S.C. or any provision of law during 
a declared war or national emergency. (DPAP, 2008, p. 103) 
 
1. Reliance on Contractors in Conflicts 
The military has been dependent on contractors for their support and expertise on 
the battlefield since the Revolutionary War; dependence has increased over time, 
reaching a one-to-one military-to-contractor ratio in the Balkans (Fontaine et al., 2010).  
There are numerous GAO reports and DoD IG audits on the DoD’s “growing reliance on 
contractors to perform combat support and combat service support (CS and CSS) 
functions” (Young, 2009).  In addition, the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
concludes, “Because the heavy reliance on contractors has overwhelmed the 
government’s ability to conduct proper planning, management, and oversight of the  
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contingency-contracting function, the government is over-reliant on contractors” 
(Thibault et al., 2011, p. 3).  Figure 1 and the adjoining text depict and explain a 
historical perspective of contracting.   
 
 
Figure 1: Importance of Contracting:  A Historical Perspective 
(From Fontaine et al., 2010, p. 9) 
 
The reliance on contractors grew unevenly: There was one civilian worker 
for every twenty soldiers in World War I, one for every seven in World 
War II, and one for every six soldiers in the Vietnam War. The end of the 
Cold War saw a dramatic increase, however, as the American military 
downsized, contractors filled the gap, and by the first Gulf War defense 
contractors were edging their way on the battlefield, mostly to maintain 
weapon systems like M1 Abrams tanks, and patriot missile batteries.  
(Miller, 2006, p. 75) 
 
The requirement for the military to employ contractors to provide support was 
significant during the Vietnam War, and an unprecedented number of contractors were 
utilized during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  It is constructive, beneficial, and essential 
to employ contractors, as they possess unique skills and expertise in diversified roles, 
which enable them to perform and provide a wide array of essential goods and services, 
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as well as play a vital role in contingency operations.  Additionally, they provide 
assistance with critical tasks such as housing, engineering, and security needs, in addition 
to fulfilling other important roles that the military not only depends on, but also requires 
for mission success.  The employment of contractors allows the military to maximize its 
number of combat soldiers in operations where the military force size is constrained.  In 
addition, contractors help to reduce the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of military 
personnel, which offsets the burden on the force structure and allows the military to 
concentrate on its wartime mission.  The selection of appropriate and qualified 
contractors result in increased efficiency and provides continuity while reducing overall 
costs.   
While there are benefits of using contractors, and they are a force multiplier in the 
battlefield that aid in the mission, there are also risks associated with the employment of 
contractors.  Some of the risks include command and control of contractors on the 
battlefield due to incompatible communication channels, and mission failure due to 
contractors’ forfeiture and unethical behaviors (Young, 2009).  Contractors are not 
government employees, and they have different contract terms and conditions that define 
their job requirements.  U.S. Federal and DoD Standards of Conduct do not apply to 
contractors, and they do not have a legal obligation to complete the mission because their 
performance is monetary driven instead of mission focused.  
The numerous ongoing debates, over whether the military should reduce its use of 
and dependence on contractors for support in conflicts, are outside the scope of this 
report.  The increased reliance on contractors is due to the increased obligations on 
contracts, as depicted in Figure 2, which caused the increase of high-dollar-value 
contracts procurements, and the large quantity and complexity of the construction 
projects. While additional contract management, oversight and surveillance personnel in 
OIF/OEF was demanded, the Army was unable to meet the demand.  During these 
conflicts, the Army failed to assess and allocate qualified and experienced personnel to 
fulfill the mission requirement (Gansler, 2007).   In addition, the Army failed to fully 
realize the impact of contractors and the importance of their role in the contracting 
process, due to the lack of policies, plans to define contractors’ roles and functions in 
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each of their assigned missions, and uniformed personnel to monitor contractor 
performance. Therefore, deficiencies in the contract management, oversight and 
surveillance have contributed to procurement fraud, and waste and abuse in contingency 
operations.    
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Obligations on Contracts ($B) Performed in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar 
(From FPDS-NG,  January 2011) 
 
Similarly, Figure 3 depicts the increased contracting spending of the Army 




  Figure 3: Army Contract Spending by Category, 1990–2010 
   (From DD350 and FPDS-NG, CSIS analysis, 2010) 
2. The Role of the COR in Contingency Operations 
The COR is one of many critical and vital personnel in the Army acquisition 
workforce, as he or she serves as the eyes and ears for the CO.  In contract management 
activities, the COR “performs critical acquisition and technical functions, and contracting 
officers rely on them to ensure that contracts are managed properly to meet mission 
needs” (Phillips, 2011, p. 57).  The responsibilities of the COR, as stated in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 46.103, is that the “COR is responsible for receiving 
technical requirements and any specifications for inspection, testing, and other contract 
quality requirements essential to ensure the integrity of the supplies or services 
prescribing contract quality requirements” (FAR, 2010, p. 2).  In addition, Table 4 in 
Appendix A outlines a detailed list of the COR’s duties and responsibilities.  Also, in the 
Defense Contingency COR Handbook published in December 2010, Chapter 5 outlines a 
comprehensive list of duties and tasks for CORs who operate in contingency operations.  
Some of the duties and responsibilities include: understand the contract, monitor the 
contractor, inspect and accept or reject deliverables, keep files current and complete, treat 
proprietary and classified information with care, manage problems, handle unsatisfactory 
performance, and track modifications (DPAP, 2010). Table 1 summarizes additional 
responsibilities of the COR. 
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Ideally, in order to perform the duties of the COR, individuals must possess the 
education and experience in the functional area that relates to the project.  But in practice, 
CORs are appointed and chosen by “happenstance” (Harvey, 2002, p. 57) to perform the 
COR duties but do not have the required COR training; therefore, they have “struggled to 
understand their roles and duties” (Phillips, 2011, p. 54); as a result, in theater, most of 
them perform on an ad hoc basis.  According to Susan Harvey, Director of Human 
Resources in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army,  
COR must have a graduate degree related to the functional area.  A 
graduate degree confers an example of individual achievement that 
requires commitment, perseverance, and capability—all traits normally 
characteristic of a seasoned manager, a COR.  Also contract management 
requires mastery of many college-level concepts such as business 
administration principles, cost-benefit analysis, negotiating techniques, 
cost modeling, and understanding of the applicable law and technical 
regulations.  Those CORs that have not been exposed to higher education 
would clearly be at a disadvantage.  (Harvey, 2002, p. 57) 
 
Table 1.   Summary of COR Responsibilities 
(From Defense Contingency COR Handbook, V.1, December 2010, p. 67) 
 
Action COR Contracting Office
Conduct market research Responsible Assist
Prepare SOW/PWS Responsible Assist
Prepare QASP Responsible Assist
Prepare IGCE Responsible Assist
Prepare GFP list Responsible Assist
Develop sources Assist Responsible
Prepare solicitation Assist Responsible
Conduct pre-bid conference Assist Responsible
Evaluate proposals Assist Responsible
Award contract N/A Responsible
Conduct contract surveillance Responsible Assist
Request modifications Responsible Assist
Make modifications Assist Responsible
Conduct progress meetings Assist Responsible
Conduct inspection/acceptance Responsible Assist
Evaluate contractor's performance Responsible Assist  
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B. GANSLER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The Gansler Commission report’s primary objective is to assess failures, review 
lessons learned, and provide recommendations to improve future Army expeditionary 
contracting operations.  In 2007, the report by the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations found that Army CORs who are 
responsible for managing contracts usually have no prior experience with contractors, and 
receive negligible training on how to manage contractors.  In addition, the Gansler 
Commission’s analysis of the Army’s acquisition workforce and contracting process to 
support expeditionary operations is summarized below: 
The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced 
military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).  Yet, only 3 
percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there 
are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer (GO) 
positions. The Army’s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, 
trained, structured, or empowered to meet the Army needs of the 21st 
Century deployed war fighters.  Only 56 percent of the military officers 
and 53 percent of the civilians in the contracting career field are certified 
for their current positions. Notwithstanding a seven-fold workload 
increase and greater complexity of contracting, the Institutional Army is 
not supporting this key capability. Notwithstanding there being almost as 
many contractor personnel in the Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan theater as there 
are U.S. military, the Operational Army does not yet recognize the impact 
of contracting and contractors in expeditionary operations and on mission 
success. What should be a core competence—contracting (from 
requirements definition, through contract management, to contract 
closeout)—is treated as an operational and institutional side issue.  
(Gansler et al., 2007, p. 30) 
 
The Gansler Commission report identifies a major area of concern: “What the 
Commission found alarming is the failure of both the Army and the DoD to perform a 
mission that is critical to operational success in theater, and where the Army was, and 
clearly is, failing in contract management” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 56).  The DoD has 
recognized that “inadequate surveillance of services contracts has left us vulnerable to the 
potential that we are paying full price for less than full value” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 
56).  According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, “Contracting performance is 
particularly vulnerable to poor oversight.  There may be a shortage of experienced and 
 12 
well-qualified CORs” (Thibault et al., 2011, p. 85). The report also made 
recommendations to “provide CORs with necessary training, prior to any military 
operation” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 56). 
C. CONTRACTING IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS CHALLENGES 
THAT CONTRIBUTE TO FRAUD 
Deployed soldiers are in a high-threat environment.  When coupled with the 
endless demands of job performance and the pressure to meet deadlines in a fast-paced 
contingency environment, this creates an abundance of ongoing challenges, both personal 
and professional.  In addition, they are also expected to adapt and conform to the cultural 
norms of the host country, and also to abide by DoD policies, rules and regulations of 
procurement contracting.   Due to the complex and diverse challenges that COs and 
CORs are faced with, they are put in difficult situations that test their moral judgment, 
and makes them vulnerable to the prospect of committing fraud, whether deliberately or 
unintentionally.   
A few of the challenges that contribute to the commission of procurement fraud 
by CORs are presented in this section.  By no means will this be a comprehensive list, as 
other challenges can stem from or are integral parts of the listed challenges.  Contributing 
factors to procurement fraud could be singular, combined, interrelated, or overlap with 
other factors.  According to the thesis survey on United States Army Contingency 
Contracting Operations conducted by Roxanne Barbaris and Christine Callanan in 
September 2008, the number one contributing factor to procurement fraud was time 
pressure; the second most common reason was lack of training.  Lack of support, a 
hostile environment, long working hours, back-to-back deployments, contract work 
volume, inefficient manpower and high contracting personnel turnover were ranked third 
to ninth, respectively (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). 
A long-term deployment has the potential to cause or intensify existing personal 
and financial problems experienced by a COR.  Multiple and/or lengthy deployments can 
trigger considerable stress and lead to low morale, making the COR susceptible to the 
perceived benefits of fraudulent activity.  Some Reserve and National Guard CORs may 
incur a substantial decrease in salary resulting from activation; 28 percent of activated 
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reservists experience a loss in earnings, according to a 2005 Rand report; and DoD 
reports place the number as high as 51 percent (Klerman, Loughran, & Martin, 2005).  
This financial pressure, coupled with extended separation from family, can provide 
motivation to engage in corrupt activities.  The COR may rationalize his or her actions in 
the belief that the Army “owes” them, or feel compelled by financial hardships back 
home.  The COR may resent the Army, and the act of fraud represents an opportunity to 
“get even.”  The demanding, and frequently dangerous, environment that a COR is 
exposed to may further impair judgment and, in conjunction with other contingency-
unique factors, impact a COR’s proclivity to engage in corrupt behavior. 
Statistics show that, although contracting in contingency operations has 
experienced dramatic increases, the Army is unable to adequately staff the contracting 
workforce to fulfill positions that would otherwise enable and ensure an efficient 
contracting process in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2006, there were only thirty-seven Army 
contracting officers in Iraq and seven in Afghanistan (Gansler, 2007).   Mr. Charles 
Williams, Director of Defense Contracting Management Agency to the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, testified where, “We have unfilled 





Figure 4: Insufficient Army Contracting Personnel to Address the Workload 
(From Gansler, J. (2007). Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, p. 32) 
 
Figure 4 depicts how the dollar value of Army contracts has increased 331 percent 
from 1992 to 2006, while the number of Army contract actions increased 654 percent 
over the same period (Gansler et al., 2007).  The shortage of contracting procurement 
personnel, including CORs, is detrimental to the contracting process; the CORs that are 
available must compensate and perform at times beyond their competencies and abilities 
to accomplish the mission.  According to the Interim Report to Congress in June 2009,  
There is a critical shortage of qualified contract management personnel in 
theater and those that are there are stretched too thin.  In particular, the 
process for designating and training COR to check contractor performance 
in theater is broken.  (Thibault et al., 2009, p. 5) 
 
Furthermore, the acquisition workforce shortage occurs, in part, due to the general 
post-Cold War drawdown in the early 1990s, as well as a general negative perception as a 
result of high-profile scandals, during the Reagan era, noting that the DoD acquisition 
workforce “underperformed and was too large” (Gates, 2009, p. 7).  The reduction of 
acquisition personnel is accomplished through the balancing of retirement-eligible 
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personnel attrition with minimal new hires.  Table 2 shows the end strength manning of 
the procurement workforce, or 11 series, which, along with the logistical fields, 
comprises the acquisition workforce.  Of particular relevance is the contract specialist 
field, which shrunk by 15 percent from 1993 to 2000. 
 
Table 2.   Number of Procurement Positions by Year 
  (From Federal Acquisition Institute, 2000, p. 4) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Gen. Bus & Ind. 
(GS-1101) 17,135       17,567       19,805       20,427       20,048       20,298       20,955       21,225       
Contract Spec. 
(GS-1102) 31,156       30,174       29,137       28,648       28,003       27,400       26,775       26,751       
Property Disposal 
(GS-1104) 1,089          1,072          1,001          989             951             908             837             766             
Purchasing    
(GS-1105) 6,644          6,410          6,005          5,558          4,875          4,248          3,793          3,414          
Proc. Clerk & 
Tech. (GS-1106) 7,948          7,298          6,597          5,923          5,296          4,645          3,966          3,583          
Industrial Spec. 
(GS-1150) 2,450          2,235          2,034          1,891          1,714          1,563          1,458          1,411          
Total 66,422       64,756       64,579       63,436       60,887       59,062       57,784       57,150        
 
Amidst the pressures to complete the mission under time constraints, CORs also 
endure lengthy work hours, usually six or seven days a week, resulting in the potential to 
take shortcuts and exhibit lack of good judgment and decision making.  Additionally, 
CORs become emotionally and physically drained, which distracts them from the tasks at 
hand, leading to resentment of the mission.  Each of these factors individually can cloud a 
person’s perception and job performance; when aggravated by low morale and lack of 
motivation, CORs are presented with opportunities to contemplate or willfully commit 
procurement fraud.   Many CORs admit that their justifications for the commission of 
procurement fraud include, but are not limited to, the incentive to pay off debt.  
Additionally, the potentially huge payoff of money allows them the opportunity to 
provide comfortably for their family upon their return.  The prolonged deployments for 
CORs, which result in being separated from their family and loved ones, create a scenario 
that clouds their mental and moral judgment when they are offered bribes from 
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contractors, presenting the possibility to get rich fast.  Their vulnerability combines with 
the temptation for a better life with the millions in bribe money that some would see as 
their reward for the hardship they have to endure during their deployment.    
Lack of training and support, compounded by the volume of contracting work, 
further exacerbates the level and depth of stress that CORs feel daily.  They lack the 
appropriate contract procurement integrity training to perform their duties, and are 
frustrated by the lack of support and communication from COs, as everyone is immersed 
in their own duties, responsibilities and critical deadlines.  The Interim Report to 
Congress in June 2009 reports that “speed during contingency contracting takes priority 
over precision” (Thibault et al., 2009, p. 7).   
The hostile and high-threat work environment in Iraq and Afghanistan further 
intensify the pressures for CORs to perform their duties while being fearful for their own 
lives and safety.  Frequent bombings and news of casualties of fallen comrades impair the 
ability of the CORs to make sensible decisions within procurement laws and guidelines.   
In a haste to meet the deadlines of increased work volume, and in fear of their own safety 
and well-being, they are mentally impaired and are unable to fully focus on their duties at 
hand.  The aggressive, combatant and austere environment, multiplied by a myriad of 
challenges while being inundated with increased work volume and deadline constraints, 
makes it inevitable for some CORs to avoid the potential pitfalls to commit procurement 
fraud.      
Despite the acquisition community’s shared recognition of the importance of 
CORs in the contract management, oversight and surveillance, there are often inadequate 
numbers of qualified CORs assigned to contractor oversight in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
There is a general lack of COR training, insufficient time for military CORs to perform 
duties, and improper alignment of COR skills to the types of service contracts they are 
required to monitor. 
D. SUMMARY 
 In the face of the changing and evolving contracting environment, contracting 
personnel including CORs are faced with performing their duties in accordance with 
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contract procurement guidelines and regulations.  Additionally, they also must work in 
austere environments and conditions that further complicate their jobs and place them in 
predicaments that affect their actions and decision making, which lead CORs to commit 
procurement fraud.  The Gansler Commission report identifies the shortcomings of Army 
expeditionary contracting and provides recommendations to enhance the Army 
expeditionary process and environment to reduce unethical behavior among the 
contracting workforce and reduce procurement fraud.  Currently, the Army is 
implementing the Gansler Commission’s recommendations to identify the COR during 
pre-deployment and to train the COR specific to contingency operations. In addition to 
hands-on training, an aggressive recruitment and retention program, and formal training 
for all CORs, these steps and actions can reduce the expeditionary contracting problems.  
The goal is to increase the warfighter’s capability by providing goods and services, while 
reducing the potential overpayment of contractors for goods and services and poor 
procurement practices. 
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III. PROCUREMENT FRAUD IN OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM/OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
A. WHY DO PEOPLE COMMIT FRAUD? 
In applying Dr. Donald Cressey’s Fraud Triangle–motivation, pressure and 
rationalization (Burton & McLean, 2009) to the COR’s fraud cases in OIF/OEF, the three 
elements of the model facilitate the understanding of why some COs and CORs alike 
commit procurement fraud.  First, the CORs’ motivation or pressure to commit 
procurement fraud can be explained by either internal physical stresses or stresses from 
outside parties.  In their role as CORs, the internal stress they feel is enormous and 
overwhelming, with numerous challenges such as deadlines, fatigue, alienation from 
loved ones, and lack of support. External stresses from outside parties are from 
commanders, COs, and contractors with whom they interact with routinely and who 
pressure the CORs to meet deadlines in accordance with contract requirements.  Also, 
working with contractors who offer bribes and gratuities creates pressure and motivation 
for the commission of fraud.  The contingency operations create an easy opportunity for 
CORs to commit procurement fraud as they have access to contract information that 
allows them to commit and conceal fraudulent activity.  Since there is a lack of internal 
control and oversight, opportunities to commit procurement fraud and conceal them are 
increased.  For rationalization, CORs justify their fraudulent activity as a reward for their 
hard work during their lengthy deployments and long work hours in a hostile 
environment.  In addition, with millions in contracts being awarded, they rationalize that 
the government has a lot of money and it is a win-win situation for them and the 
contractors.   
Figure 5 captures diverse and personal behavioral issues of those involved in 
fraudulent activity. The top three categories of fraud behaviors are: being too friendly 
with vendors, living beyond their means, and possessing a wheeler-and-dealer attitude 
(Ratley, 2010).  This informative list provides additional insight into the fraudsters’ 
background and their mental status, which is further exacerbated by a myriad of 




Figure 5: Behavior Red Flags During Fraud SchemeFigure 
(After 2010 ACFE Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse) 
 
B. PROCUREMENT FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
As detailed in Chapter II, either a single factor or a combination of interconnected 
factors during lengthy deployments in a combative environment can immensely affect the 
physical, emotional, and mental well-being of CORs, and impair their judgment to 
effectively fulfill their duties and responsibilities.  Their stress level is heightened due to 
the pressures of procurement deadlines while they are forced to perform job requirements 
with limited training, experience, and support from their commanders and COs.  
Ultimately, their morale, values, and beliefs are under attack, which increases the 
temptation for procurement fraud.  As a result, many Army CORs are overwhelmed 
during their prolonged deployment in a hostile environment where bribes and corruption 
are the norm.  Considering all these factors, CORs who are unable to cope often succumb 
to the commission of procurement fraud. Three scenarios that provide examples of Army 
COR convictions of fraud and bribery are discussed in the following paragraph.  
Figure 6 illustrates the number of open fraud investigations by service branch.  In 
addition, the data reveals that Army contracting personnel comprise 28 percent of all 
contracting personnel, but account for nearly all investigative cases.  In comparison, the 
 21 
Air Force has 70 percent of the contracting personnel, but only one open fraud case.   The 
charts also show that a significant number of Army personnel in their roles as COs and 
CORs are targets of the procurement fraud investigations.  The data suggests that there 
are shortfalls with the Army contracting personnel’s education, training, and experience 
level, which have resulted in significantly higher numbers of Army personnel involved in 
procurement fraud and in open investigations, compared to their Air Force and Navy 
counterparts (Gansler et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 6: Major Procurement Frauds in OIF/OEF 
(From Gansler, et al., 2007, p. 22–23) 
 
C. CASE ANALYSIS CONVICTIONS 
Both the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) work closely with 
prosecutors, U.S. partner investigative agencies, coalition partner investigators, and law 
enforcement personnel from other countries to conduct criminal investigations to pursue 
allegations of procurement fraud, abuse, and waste in Iraq.  These continuous 
investigations result in arrests, indictments, convictions, and sentencings.  In addition, 
monetary results include more than $71.2 million in fines, forfeitures, recoveries, and 
restitution (SIGIR, 2007).  In October 2006, former Deputy Attorney General Paul J. 
McNutty announced the formation of the National Procurement Fraud Task Force, which 
is to promote the early detection, identification, prevention, and prosecution of 
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procurement fraud associated with the increase in government contracting activity for 
national security and other government programs.  The Procurement Task Force includes 
United States Attorney Offices, the FBI, the U.S. Inspectors General community, and a 
number of other federal law enforcement agencies.  As a result of their commitment and 
dedication to ensure the integrity of the government procurement process, they have 
brought forth numerous cases of procurement fraud committed by DoD employees in 
their roles as CORs in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan.   
 During OIF/OEF, most contracting officials performed their duties with integrity 
and honor, though there are also numerous cases of unethical behavior by contracting 
officials including CORs while providing support in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
September 2009 Department of Defense Inspector General Semi-Annual Report to the 
Congress of the United States of America identified a number of bribery, conspiracy, 
money laundering, and wire fraud violations committed by contracting officials, CORs, 
and contractors  (SIGIR, 2007). 
 One example is in the case of an Army officer who pleaded guilty to procurement 
fraud.  In his work as a COR, Derrick L. Shoemake, a former U.S. Army major, pleaded 
guilty to bribery for his work in Kuwait from 2004 to 2006.   MAJ Shoemake was in 
charge of coordinating and accepting the delivery of bottled water in support of U.S. 
troops in Iraq.  Court documents revealed that MAJ Shoemake agreed to assist a 
contractor with his delivery of bottled water; in return, the contractor paid him 
approximately $215,000, which was delivered to MAJ Shoemake’s designee in Los 
Angeles (DoJ, 2011).  For his influence over the award of bottled water contracts in 
Afghanistan, MAJ Shoemake also received $35,000 from another contractor.  MAJ 
Shoemake admitted he received, in total, approximately $250,000 from the two 
government contractors  (DoJ, 2011). 
Another example of procurement fraud was in the case of United States Army 
Captain Austin Key, who was stationed in Baghdad, Iraq.  As a field ordering officer 
(FOO), Key had the authority to purchase supplies for the U.S. Army, and as a COR, Key 
oversaw the administration of service and supply contracts that were awarded by the U.S. 
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Army and worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.  According to indictment documents 
from the U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of New York, Key approached a 
confidential informant (CI) who was a U.S. citizen and owned a business that contracted 
with the U.S. Army in Baghdad, Iraq, to provide services and supplies.  It was reported 
that Key demanded $155,000 from the CI in order for the CI’s company to receive future 
contract awards.  (DoD IG, 2007) 
Also included in the complaint was information that the CI reported Key’s 
demands to law enforcement authorities and agreed to another meeting with Keys so that 
their conversation could be recorded.  During the subsequent meeting, Key informed the 
CI that, for $50,000, he would give the CI confidential and advanced information on 
contracts in addition to demanding 5 percent on contracts that he steered to the CI.  In a 
follow-up meeting, Key was given the $50,000 cash that had been agreed on in the 
previous meeting.  As he was leaving, law enforcement officials stopped Key and 
retrieved the $50,000.  Key was charged with one count of bribery.  If convicted, Key 
faces a maximum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $250,000.  
(DoD IG, 2007) 
A third case of procurement fraud conviction was the case of Army Captain 
Bryant Williams, who also served as FOO and COR.  In 2005 and 2006, then 1st 
Lieutenant Williams was with the Army’s 101st Airborne Division in Iraq and served as 
one of the division’s points of contact with local service contractors.  Two contractors 
were working with Williams in their bids on contracts with the U.S. Army to provide a 
wide array of goods and services, including copiers and building guard towers. 
The two contractors, Harith Aljabawi and Mike Naji, who own Joshua 
Construction and Phoenix Contractors, respectively, said at trial that Williams threatened 
them at gunpoint to give him a cut of the profits when they got contracts.  According to 
the U.S. Attorney District Court Office of the Southern District of New York, Williams 
received more than $30,000 in bribes from the contractors to steer more than $930,000 
worth of contracts, and was sentenced to three years in federal prison for taking bribes to 
steer Army contracts in Iraq.  At William’s sentencing, U.S. District Judge Barbara Jones 
said, “Williams forged bids on behalf of other companies, knowingly collected false and 
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forged bids from certain contractions, and on one occasion, threatened a contractor with a 
firearm in the course of demanding payment of bribes” (Klaseld, 2011). 
 In an effort to conceal some of the payoffs, prosecutors announced that Williams 
had one contractor send $20,000 in cash to an Iowa address while another $12,000 was 
wired from Dubai to another individual’s U.S. bank account.  It was believed that 
Williams collected the money when he returned to the United States. Williams’ Defense 
attorney David Greenfield claimed that Williams should receive leniency for his many 
years of military service, during which he received many awards and commendations.  
Hence, Williams was sentenced to only three years in federal prison; he is appealing his 
conviction, denying that he took any money in kickbacks from contractors (Klaseld, 
2011). 
D. SUMMARY   
 As illustrated in the three cases described in the previous section, these military 
officers did not act ethically and did not perform their duties effectively to represent the 
U.S. government’s best interests. U.S. employees are expected to place loyalty, ethical 
principles, and laws above private gain and interests.  In addition, they are to conduct 
business dealings in a manner above reproach in every aspect while protecting the 
interests of the United States, as well as maintaining its reputation for fair and equal 
dealings with all contractors.  They are also trained to refuse any gift or gratuity from any 
contractor, regardless of the dollar value, and not to threaten or reprimand any contractor.  
In their role as CORs, they manage and monitor contracts that are worth hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. CORs commit procurement fraud in these cases for many reasons, 
including greed, lack of integrity and impaired moral judgment.  The authority that they 
possess, combined with inefficient oversight of the contracting process, allows them to 
take bribes and steer contracts to their private gain, assuming that they will not be caught.    
 25 
IV. CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE TRAINING 
AND EDUCATION 
A. BACKGROUND 
A myriad of GAO reports and DoD IG audits address the systemic issues and 
high-risk areas of contract management and call for actions needed to emphasize contract 
surveillance and oversight dilemmas.  Appendix B contains a complete list of these 
reports.  The overall message in all of these reports is the need to ensure that properly 
trained individuals are assigned to perform contract surveillance and oversight functions 
before contracts are awarded.  In addition, Pentagon officials stated, “Among the 
problems with the oversee purchases of products and services worth nearly $100 billion a 
year that call for immediate action are inadequate training, lack of technical expertise and 
insufficient knowledge of the industries that supply goods and services to the Defense 
Department” (Erwin, 2006, p. 20).  According to Defense FAR supplement (DFARS) 
§201.602–2(ii), 
CORs must be qualified by both experience and training commensurate 
with the responsibilities to be delegated.  COR responsibilities must be in 
writing and that the responsibilities cannot be re-delegated.  For those 
reasons, the CO is expected to appoint a properly trained COR.  (DFARS, 
2011, section 201.6–2)  
In a deployed environment, CORs not only have to be physically and mentally fit, 
but they must also be skilled in their duties in order perform their assigned tasks to 
accomplish the mission.  They will have minimal or no supervision to conduct their day- 
to-day business operations.  They are required to uphold the rules and regulations that 
dictate their business transactions and understand the foreign cultures, customs, 
languages and business practices. 
An Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) memo dated November 26, 
2007, established mandatory training and certification requirements for personnel 
performing technical or administrative functions during contract surveillance:  
 All CORs appointed to a contract after the effective date of the 
memorandum must be certified no later than 6 months from their date of 
appointment. The Federal COR certification program established 
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competency-based core training and assignment-specific training to 
achieve and maintain the COR certification. Once certified, CORs must 
maintain their contracting skills and knowledge through continuous 
learning.  (OMB, 2007, p. 2) 
B. EXISTING COR TRAINING PROGRAMS 
Having a trained COR is critical and paramount for mission success and achieving 
positive contracting outcomes in contracting oversight and surveillance in contingency 
operations.  Prior to OIF/OEF,  
The Army failed to correlate the growing role of contractors providing 
mission essential supplies and services on the battlefield, with the 
requirement to have an adequately sized and capable acquisition 
workforce to include CORs.  The result was a workforce that was 
understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported, and…most 
importantly, under-valued.  (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 3)  
 
The Army Contracting Agency (ACA) published two documents pertaining to 
COR training requirements: Minimum Curriculum Training Requirements in 2004 and 
Guidance for CORs in 2005.  These documents outline COR training requirements by 
taking either a one-week, forty-hour COR course at the USA Logistics Management 
College (ALMC) or its equivalent.  The ALMC-CL COR course is an overall view of the 
contracting process, with major emphasis in contract administration. It focuses on 
services, supplies, and construction contracts (ALU, 2011).  In addition, the course offers 
some familiarity with statutory laws and regulations, such as FAR and DFARS, which 
govern the contracting process (ALU, 2011).  The equivalency for the ALMC-CL COR 
course is the DAU continuous learning course (CLC) 106 COR with a Mission Focus 
(ALU, 2011).  However, the CLC 106 course requires only eight hours of web-based 
instruction training, and focuses on the acquisition process, contract classification and 
types, ethics and integrity, authorities, proper file documentation, performance 
assessment methods, remedies for poor performance, invoice requirements, contract 
modifications, and contract management.  Appendix C provides a complete breakdown of 
the DAU-required COR courses module.    
The Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) adopts the COR 
training requirements offered by the DAU by publishing the Standard Operation 
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Procedure (SOP) number 10–02, dated January 2010, for the COR program.  It directs 
that all CORs must take two DAU online courses: the CLC 106 course and the 
continuous learning module (CLM) 003—Overview of Acquisition Ethics.  The CLM 
003 course reinforces several important legal ethics standards, which include conflicts of 
interest, gratuities from contractors, and the Procurement Integrity Act.  The objectives of 
the course are to provide personnel with an awareness of some ethical dilemmas and 
illustrate some techniques to avoid unethical behaviors and actions (DAU, 2010d).  Even 
though these DAU courses meet the requirements for COR appointment in OIF and OEF, 
they are not enough for CORs to effectively function and perform their duties.  
According to the Report to the President and Congress of the United States by the U.S. 
Merit Systems Protection Board, “Our data indicates that one-time training is often not 
sufficient to ensure that CORs have and maintain the skills they need to do their job” 
(U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 2005, p. 51).  During OIF/OEF, many of the 
CORs performed ad hoc COR duties because they were inexperienced with the 
contracting process, had little or no supervision, and did not have any other prior 
contracting training.  According to the Gansler Commission Report, “Senior Army 
contracting leaders found the DAU’s web-based education to be inadequate for 
expeditionary contracting operations” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 27).  In addition, “CORs 
are inadequately trained, if trained at all” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 23). 
The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Office of Policy and Evaluation 
surveyed CORs from ten agencies that accounted for 90 percent of the government’s 
contracting dollars, learning that “Agencies need to fulfill the regulatory aspects of 
managing CORs to include formal delegation of authority, improved COR training, and 
strategic management of the COR workforce” (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 
2005, p. i).  In addition, according to a SIGIR report from July 28, 2011, “Almost forty 
percent of the CORs we surveyed said the training they received did not prepare them for 
their duties and twenty-five percent said that they lack sufficient time to conduct effective 
oversight” (SIGIR, 2011, p. 1).  Similar surveys were conducted to find how the CORs 
viewed the training they received by Kamradt, Choi, and McIntosh.  The question asked, 
“Do you have adequate training time to fully accomplish your COR duties?”  (Kamradt, 
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Choi, & McIntosh, 2010, p. 51).  Figure 7 illustrates that 40 percent of CORs responded 
that they received inadequate training time to fully accomplish their duties. 
 
 
Figure 7: Training Time to Fully Accomplish COR duties 
(After Kamradt, Choi, and McIntosh, 2010, p. 51) 
 
C. ETHIC REGULATIONS AND STATUTES 
 According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting Final Report to Congress 
in August 2011, “At least $31 billion and possibly as much as $60 billion, has been lost 
to contract waste, fraud, and abuse in OIF/OEF.  Some forms of contract fraud, waste and 
abuse are “due to criminal behavior and blatant corruption” (Thibault et al., 2011, p. 1).  
In addition, contract management routinely changes hands “between multiple CORs 
during a contract-performance period without a thorough transfer of knowledge” 
(Thibault et al., 2011, p. 29), which increases the likelihood and possibility that CORs 
will encounter situations in which they will face ethical dilemmas.  CORs who are 
continually exposed to offers of gratuities or kickbacks may eventually engage in corrupt 
activities.  From the foreign local contractor’s perspective, that type of behavior may be 
considered legitimate or accepted business practices.  Local contractors may not 
understand or may choose to ignore U.S. government procurement regulations that 
govern improper business practices.  Since corruption can be deeply rooted in the cultural 
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mindset, it can be a challenging force to overcome.  Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, the SIGIR, 
referred to corruption as “the second insurgency” in Iraq, and compared it to “a cancer” 
that had spread and overtaken the country (Stuart, Conference remarks, November 2, 
2010).  Both Iraq and Afghanistan are countries where government corruption is the norm 
prior to the arrival of U.S. forces.  In fact, both countries still rank near the bottom of 178 
countries rated on a scale where zero is the most corrupt and ten is the least corrupt, as 
shown in Table 3.    
Table 3.   Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 




1 New Zealand 9.3
1 Singapore 9.3
4 Finland 9.2




178 Somalia 1.1  
 
In order for Army CORs to avoid some of the common offenses, such as fraud, 
bribery, conspiracy to defraud, contractor kickbacks and accepting illegal gifts in the 
contingency environment, it is imperative that they receive the appropriate ethical 
training, and understand the laws, regulations, and rules that apply to contingency 
operations as outlined in the Joint Ethics Regulation (JER).  CORs must know the 
possible ramifications and consequences for their actions or inactions in regards to ethical 
violations.  The ramification and consequences include felony charges, conviction, jail, 
and fines, as described in Chapter III.  During federal investigations for procurement 
fraud, an individual can “suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune that will 
come in terms of thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket expenses for a criminal lawyer, 
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subcontracted subject matter expert attorney, polygraphs, and most of all, the stress on 
families and marriages” (Knauer, 2010, p. 13).  The CORs are expected to maintain the 
highest standard of conduct as they are representing the U.S. government (USG) and 
DoD; therefore, they must be knowledgeable and understand the following ethical 
statutes in order to conduct themselves with integrity in the contingency environment.    
 The ethics rules—18 USC 201–208 statutes—cover bribery, gratuities, and 
conflicts of interest, which are some of the most common ethical violations committed by 
Army CORs.  Bribery includes giving a government employee something of value for the 
purpose of influencing the performance of an official duty.  An example of bribery is 
when a government employee accepts something of value from a contractor such as 
money, liquor, food and gifts in exchange for preferential treatment  (DoD IG, 1987).    
Gratuities include giving a government employee something of value because of his or 
her official position.  An example of gratuities is when a COR solicits and receives 
gratuities from a contractor; these include meals, video equipment, trips, and cars, for 
which there was no evidence that he did anything in return for these gratuities (DoD IG, 
1987).  Conflicts of interest include situations where a COR engages in activities that 
create a conflict between his/her personal interests and his/her duty to protect and serve 
the government’s interest (DoD IG, 1987).  An example of a conflict of interest is when a 
subcontractor was awarded the contract by a COR, and in turn, the subcontractor was to 
further subcontract to a firm that was owned by the COR’s family members or relatives.  
In any situation, CORs must not use their official position for their private gains. 
D. CURRENT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND CERTIFICATION FOR 
ARMY CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES 
Since 2007, the Army has recognized and emphasized the importance of operation 
contracting support in contingency operations and has implemented the DoD’s standard 
COR training programs.  “The Army’s top military procurement official, Lieutenant 
General Joseph Yakovac, who has been pushing for additional training for service buyers 
and has expressed concern about the Army’s ability to manage the escalating complexity 
of military systems” (Erwin, 2006, p. 20).  It is imperative that CORs receive proper 
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training because, “Failure to have individuals trained as CORs can hinder management 
and contract oversight and surveillance, which result in the waste of taxpayers’ dollars 
and mission failure” (Williams, 2011, p. 4).   
Through Section 813 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 
2007, Congress directed the DoD to conduct a department-wide review of vulnerabilities 
to fraud, waste and abuse in contracting integrity in contingency operations (Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2008).  In addition, Congress directed the DoD to identify 
the causes of contract surveillance and oversight vulnerabilities.  Therefore, the DoD 
established the Panel on Contracting Integrity, which includes a working group 
subcommittee on sufficient contract surveillance and subject matter experts (SME) from 
various agencies that review current DoD policies, processes, and practices regarding 
contract surveillance of defense contracts; the primary focus is on COR responsibilities, 
training, assignment process, and surveillance documentation (Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L), 2008).  In 2008, the working group identified some general and 
technical competencies for CORs, characterized training requirements for three COR 
types in contingency operations, and developed a certification standard for CORs to 
implement in DoD organizations.  Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix D and E depict lists of the 
general and technical competency skills for CORs.  In addition, the working group 
recommended that CORs be properly trained prior to contract award, and the CORs’ 
efforts must be reflected in performance assessment.  
Below is a summary of the three COR types based on the complexity, contract 
type and dollar value recommended by the working group for the Army and DoD to 
identify which training is appropriate and pertinent to the unit’s mission.    The DAU has 
begun implementation of the COR training curriculum to reflect these evolving 
requirements in contingency operation as mandated by DoD.  The details of each COR 
type are outlined in Appendices F, G and H.  (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 
2008) 
1.  COR Type A—is the low performance risk fixed priced requirements 
without incentives contracting function.  The attributes of this contract 
function include the lack of technical or administrative complexity, no 
identifiable risk factors, and low likelihood of modifications.  The duties 
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and responsibilities are generally limited to minimal technical and/or 
administrative monitoring of the contract.  The type A contracting 
function requires individuals to serve as COR to have at least six months 
of general experiences or relevant experience as determined by supervisor 
or CO.  The requirement training is the CLC 106 and the new module 
CLC 206 for CORs who operate the contingency environment.  The CLC 
206 covers the basics of contracting, along with the ethical situations and 
cultural differences a COR who may experience while deployed in a 
contingency. (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2008) 
2. COR Type B—is anything other than low performance risk 
requirements listed in type A.  The attributes of these requirements 
involves a more complex work and other than fixed priced contract types 
such as cost-type or time and materials contract, and performing duties in 
multiple regions or in remote geographic locations.  The duties and 
responsibilities are of increased complexity; therefore, it requires 
individuals to serve as a COR to have twelve months of general 
experience or relevant experience as determined by supervisor and CO.  
The training requirement for COR type B is the CLC 222 COR resident 
course.  CLC 222 specifically designs for CORs who are responsible for 
assuring that contractors are performing the technical portion of their job. 
It provides CORs with the breadth of knowledge of the roles and 
responsibilities, as well as fundamentals of contracting regulations, types, 
phases, and other elements such as ethical, legal, and cultural factors that 
impact COR’s responsibilities.  In addition, CLC 222 provides 
information necessary to effectively evaluate situations and dilemmas, 
allows COR to apply knowledge gained and make correct decisions to 
carry out his or her responsibilities. (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 
2008) 
3. COR Type C—is a unique contract requirement that necessitate a 
professional license, technical license or higher education, beyond the type 
B requirement.  The attributes of these requirements include 
environmental remediation, major weapons systems, medical services, 
dental services, and veterinarian services.  The duties and responsibilities 
are highly complex and specialized.  The experience requirement in order 
to serve as COR is twelve months of general experience or relevant 
experience as determined by supervisor and CO.  The training 
requirements are CLC 222 to include mandatory and specialized training 
as determined by the Army. (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2008) 
 
In 2009, the Army issued an Execution Order 48–10 to its lower echelon for the 
requirements for the COR program.  The order directs Army units to determine their 
COR in-theater requirements and to plan on “eighty CORs for a brigade, twenty-five 
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CORs for a separate battalion, and fifteen CORs for a separate company” (Williams, 
2011, p. 5).  In addition, the order mandates that deploying brigades must have soldiers 
designated and trained as CORs prior to their deployment.  These requirements are 
achievable because the COR curriculum is provided to the Army noncommissioned 
officer at the senior leader course.  Currently, the Army Expeditionary Contracting 
Command (ECC) has a training program called contingency contracting unit training 
(C2UT), designed to train and educate CORs and unit leaders on procurement ethics, 
defining requirements, and contract oversight and surveillance.  “The overall end state of 
the C2UT program is to teach and train those have been appointed to oversee contract 
support and what rules they have to follow in order to maximize the support and to help 
them accomplish their mission with utmost efficiency” (Williams, 2011, p. 5).  According 
to Mr. Kim Denver, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Procurement (DASA 
(P),  
In 2010 and 2011, the Army Logistics University (ALU) trained 8,568 
CORs, the ECC trained 2,317 Soldiers as CORs since October 2010 and 
also more than 5,500 Army CORs received theater-specific supplemental 
training from the Joint Operations prior to their assignment in contingency 
operations.  (Denver, 2011, p. 92) 
E. SUMMARY 
As identified in the GAO, DoD IG and Gansler reports, lack of sufficient 
education and specific training programs affect the abilities of CORs to perform their 
duties in wartime contracting.  As a result of these contracting process and requirement 
deficiencies, the DoD has implemented education and requirements to enhance COR 
knowledge and competencies to ensure they meet certification standards prior to the 
awarding of contracts.  There is also emphasis on continuous education via the 
continuous learning module (CLM) and acquisition ethics, designed to ensure that CORs 
recognize the importance of ethical standards and conduct themselves with integrity and 
in accordance with JER.  In addition, CORs must have knowledge of the contracting 
process, contract administration, and statutory laws and regulations to meet certification 
standards.  CORs provide a very critical role in the contracting process and 
administration; with their knowledge of general and technical core competencies, they 
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greatly contribute to expeditionary contracting.  While COR education and training is 
greatly enhanced over what it was just a few short years ago, it is equally important to 
build a culture of effective collaboration and communication between the CO and CORs, 
so that, together, they can effectively and ethically provide vital support in contingency 
operations.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Expeditionary contracting has been transformed over time and has evolved into 
intricate operations with diverse processes, personnel requirements and environmental 
challenges.  Contingency operations involve numerous acquisition policies and practices, 
by which military personnel, government employees and contractors must abide.  The 
integration of diverse personnel, with an increased reliance and utilization of contractors, 
are to assist the Army in meeting the demands for management, oversight and 
surveillance of personnel in a wartime environment.  In the Army acquisition workforce, 
the COR performs many critical functions, as COs and contractors alike are dependent on 
them to fulfill essential duties in the contracting process, and to ensure successful 
contract execution, performance, and administration.   
Due to the increased involvement of contractors and CORs in contingency 
operations, there have been documented shortcomings of the contracting process, 
oversight and surveillance due to the lack of a comprehensive education and training 
program for CORs who must be prepared for the multi-faceted role in OIF and OEF.  
Lack of adequate education—including the contracting basics and processes, contract 
administration, procurement ethics, and statutory laws and regulations—significantly 
hinders the CORs’ abilities to fully accomplish their duties and responsibilities.  It is also 
wasting billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money.  According to Michael J. Thibault, Co-
Chair of Wartime Contracting Commission,  
The biggest challenge is waste.  We have found billions of dollars of waste 
stemming from a variety of shortcomings—poor decision making, vague 
contract requirements, lack of adequately trained COR to oversight people 
in the field, duplicative or unnecessary work, failure to revise or 
recomplete contracts, unsustainable projects, in adequate business 
processes among contractors, and delayed audits.  (Thibault et al., 2011, 
p.1)   
 
Many of the shortcomings listed above are a direct result of inefficient COR job 
performance.  Therefore, it is imperative that the DoD emphasize and enforce education, 
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training, and certification requirements for CORs prior to their appointment.  In doing so, 
CORs will be more efficient in their job performance, and the amount of waste from 
deficient processes and performance will be greatly reduced.   
In addition to waste in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are also numerous cases and 
open investigations of procurement fraud as well as convictions.  “The Commission’s 
conservative estimate of waste and fraud is about $31 to $60 billion based on contract 
spending from 2001 projected through the end of FY 2011” (Thibault et al., 2011, p. 1).  
The Gansler Commission report identified that the Army failed in the area of contract 
management and adequate surveillance of service contracts (Gansler et al., 2007).  These 
contracting process deficiencies, combined with a shortage of qualified contracting 
personnel, create the potential for the commission of procurement fraud by some of the 
CORs.  Lack of internal control and oversight increases the likelihood of fraudulent 
activity.  In an effort to reduce procurement fraud cases in future expeditionary 
operations, the DoD has taken measures to review and enhance the Army expeditionary 
contracting process and environment, contract procurement guidelines and regulations, as 
well as the procurement ethical framework. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
CORs are integral members of the Army acquisition workforce in that they have 
critical roles in ensuring that the government gets the best value for its money spent and 
in accomplishing the mission.  In addition, they have extensive technical responsibilities 
in the monitoring of contracts to ensure each phase is completed according to contracting 
process guidelines. Leaders should give credence to the appointment of CORs as they are 
vital to the contracting workforce, and not merely organization members who occupy 
non-critical positions.  CORs who possess the adequate and appropriate certification will 
work with COs and contractors to contribute greatly and effectively in the contracting 
process.   
Several critical areas are recommended for the Army to address to effectively 
enhance its capability and success in future contingency operations.  The first area is to 
enforce the educational requirements, training, and certification prior to the appointment 
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of CORs.  Equally important is mandating that CORs receive hands-on training in 
addition to enforcement of a quarterly ethics training program (ETP).  Administering an 
ETP encourages CORs to think critically and act ethically by upholding the wartime 
contracting laws, rules and regulations.  The purpose of the ETP is to help reduce 
unethical violations and emphasize ethics awareness.  The ETP must be conducted by 
SMEs via seminars, lectures, and roundtable discussions.   The ETP needs to include the 
challenges of working in austere environments, such as fast-paced, stressful, and possibly 
corrupt, as well as the cultural practices of the host country.  Lessons of realistic 
procurement fraud conviction case scenarios should also be presented.  Additionally, 
education and training must be a continuous process that includes federal contract law in 
foreign countries and compliance, as well as DoD contract regulations and policies.  
Periodic assessments of current program requirements should be completed, and updated 
program mandates should be reviewed and implemented.  
Furthermore, expeditionary contracting and contractors on the battlefield continue 
to be key players in contingency operations.  The following manning and resource 
recommendations are made for the Army to review and implement:   
1.  Create COR position as additional skill identifiers (ASI) for senior NCOs 
(SSG(P) through MSG), warrant officers (WO1 through CW3), and company grade 
officers (2LT through CPT), because these individuals have the education, experiences, 
demeanor, and drive to force contractors to meet or exceed the contract standards.   
2.  Ensure that CORs perform their contract duties and responsibilities and that no 
other assigned duties will conflict those contract responsibilities. 
3.  Implement the COR certification levels as outlined in the OMB memorandum 
dated September 6, 2011.  The objectives of the certification are to ensure that CORs 
meet the training and experience requirements, maintain current skill levels, and 
revalidate their competencies.  Figure 8 depicts the new COR certification requirement 




Figure 8: COR Certification Requirements 
(From OMB, 2011, p. A-4) 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As stated above, the OFPP issued a new memorandum dated September 6, 2011, 
which was a revision to the 2007 OFPP memo for Federal Acquisition COR.  The 
purpose of the new revision memorandum was to “revise the competency requirements 
for CORs and to establish a risk-based, three-tiered certification program for federal 
civilian agencies in order to better reflect the important role of the COR” (OMB, 2011, p. 
2).   
The new CORs certification requirements are effective January 1, 2012, for all 
federal agencies, and will not be effective for the DoD.  While CORs in the DoD interact 
with other federal agencies, they are bound by different certification requirements.  It is 
imperative that DoD CORs who are engaged in the interagency contracting process 
possess the same knowledge and certification as their federal counterparts.  The uniform 
guidelines for federal agency employees and DoD employees will result in more 
productivity and effective work processes.   
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For further research, it is recommended that the DoD review the effectiveness of 
the implementation and progress of the new COR certification requirements for all 
federal agencies. Another area of research that should be considered is how to recruit 
more technical expertise, such as engineers and construction specialists, as CORs to join 
the acquisition workforce to oversee technical contracts in contingency operations.  These 
technical capacities potentially provide better compliance with contract surveillance and 
oversight, achieve positive contract outputs and outcomes in terms of goods and services, 
and also maintain good stewardship and accountability of taxpayers’ money.  
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APPENDIX A. COR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Table 4.   COR Duties and Responsibilities  
  (After Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2008) 
 
a.  Be knowledgeable of terms and conditions, as well as the technical content in the contract/order/agreement.
b.  Establish and maintain a COR file in accordance with agency/component procedures.  COR file will include 
items, such as, a copy of COR delegatin letter, copy of signed contract and modifications, surveillance/performance 
assessment plan (if applicable), wirtten communciations with the Contractor/CO, trip reports, documentation of 
telephone conversations/meetings, surveillance documents, invoice/payment documentation, and all documentation 
that is required to record, evaluate, and report the Contractor's performance.
c.  Determine the need, and ensure all requirements are met for Contractor badges, background checks, and all 
other required security clearances.
d.  Maintain liaison and direct communciations with the contractor's representative, CO, customer, and other 
authorized representatives related to the contract/project, including participating in meetings/discussions as 
requested by the CO (i.e. post-award orientation conferences, negotiations).
e.  Advise the Contractor to submit requests for changes in writing to the CO.  Assure the changes in work under a 
contract are not implemented before written authorization or a contract modification is issued by the CO
f.  Recommend to the CO any changes in scope and/or technical provisions of the contract/order/agreement with 
wirtten justification for the proposed action.
g.  Provide clarification of technical requirements to the Contractor, as necessary, without making changes or 
agreeing to makes changes to the contract/order/agreement.
h.  Coordinate with the Contractor and CO to resolve issues and monitor corrective actions.
i.  Use extreme care to avoid supervising the Contractor's employees.  Must not interfere with the manner which the 
contractor assigns work or with contractor's relations with organized labor.
j.  Assist the CO with close-out of contracts; especially with the orderly transition or completion of work as 
contractor workforce is phaed out.
k.  Ensure COR files are provided to the CO during contract close-out.
l.  Serve as the central POC to assure that any Government obligations stated in the solicitation are completed (GFP 
is in place, review/approval of submittals, plans or procedures required by the PWS are obtained, etc.)
m.  If COR responsibilities are transferred to a new COR before the contract is completed, ensure that all relevant 
information for the contract is turned over to the new COR.
n.  Refer to the CO any request from a Contractor for the release of information.
o.  Review and recommend acceptance of Contractor's quality control plan.
p.  Ensure the Contractor's compliance with procedures regarding restrictive markings on data, if applicable.
q.  Recorgnize and report to the CO any organizational COI between Contractors.
r.  Monitor the Contractor's compliance with safety (i.e OSHA), security, labor (i.e Service Contract Act) and 
environmental law and regulatory requirements.
s.  Assist the CO in negotiating any proposed increases or decreases in scope of work by providing independent 
cost estimates and/or technical evaluations.
t.  Provide feedback on Contractor performance as input to the past performance data base (i.e. CPARS) or as 
otherwise requested by CO.
u.  Monitor Contractor performance and ensure that the Contractor performs the requirements of the 
contract/order/agreement in accordance with the terms, conditions, and specifications.  This includes ensuring that 
all required items, documentation, data and/or reports are properly and timely submitted as contractually required.
v.  For PBSC, perform on-site surveillance in accordance with the surveillance plan.  Assure technical proficiency 
and compliance with the technical provisions of the contract by review and verification of the performance of work 
accomplished by the Contractor.
w.  Notify the Contractor of deficiencies observed during surveillance (i.e. anticipated performance fialures, late 
deliveries, nonconforming work, security violations, hazardous working conditions, impropert use of Goernment 
material) and recommend appropriate action to CO to effect correction.
x.  Review Contractor requests for travel, overtime, Government assets, or subcontracting, in a timely manner, and 
forward to the CO for approval.
y.  Review and analyze the Contractor's deliverables, service and management reports.
z.  Review interim invoices (CR, LH and T&M cotnracts) to make sure charges are commensurate with observed 
performance (i.e. travel was necessary and actually occurred, labor hours charged are commensurate with level of 
work performed).   
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APPENDIX C. COR TRAINING MODULES 
(From DAU Certification Courses.  Retrieved from 
https://learn.dau.mil/Atlas2/faces/page/atlasSE/desktop/DesktopHome.seam?tabId=20&c
id=tab_20)   
 
CLC 106:  COR with a Mission Focus 
This course provides the learner with the basic skill set needed to be a COR and 
an overview of the acquisition process, teaming, ethics and integrity, authorities, contract 
classification, contract types, proper file documentation, performance assessment 
methods, remedies for poor performance, invoice requirements, contract modifications, 
and contract management. 
Lesson One:  Acquisition Process Overview 
Identify the three phases of the Acquisition Process 
Describe an effective acquisition team 
Lesson Two:  Ethics and Integrity are Essential 
Recognize regulatory limitations on the conduct of Procurement Personnel 
Recognize your ethical responsibilities 
Lesson Three:  Authorities 
Recognize legal concepts, statutory and procedural regulations applicable to 
Federal Government 
Identify the classification of contracts 
Describe the frequently used Contract types 
Identify the difference between Real and Apparent Authority 
Recognize the conditions that must be meet before becoming a COR 
Lesson Four:  Assessing Performance—Getting the Mission Results  
Recognize the importance of proper file documentation 
Be able to itemize those documents that are to be included in the COR file 
Discuss the methods of performance assessment available to the COR 
Identify remedies for poor performance 
Lesson Five:  Contract Administration Essentials 
Identify proper invoice requirements 
Identify requirements for timely processing of contractor invoices 
Distinguish between a “change” and a “constructive change” 
Identify the COR responsibilities regarding Government Furnished Property 
Lesson Six:  Planning the Acquisition—Getting the Requirement Right 
Identify the procedures and elements used in planning the acquisition 
Recognize the importance of competition 
Lesson Seven:  Executing the Acquisition—Selecting the Right Contractor 
Identify the key events of the execution phase 
Recognize the points within the acquisition process where the potential for 
conducting an unfair competition is high  
Lesson Eight:  Special Interest Areas 
Construction Type Contracts 
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Research and Development 
CLC 206:  COR in a Contingency Environment 
This course is designed specifically for CORs who are deployed in a contingency 
environment.  It covers the basics of contracting, along with the ethical situations and 
cultural differences a COR may experience while deployed in a contingency operation 
Lesson one:  Contract Basics 
Identify the responsibilities of the COR in relation to the contract and its related 
elements (to include QASP and PWS 
 Identify how the COR should handle and address information security issues 
Lesson two:  The Contingency Environment 
Identify how potential organizational conflicts of interest can affect contract 
management 
Identify how a COR reports suspected incidents of fraud, waste, and abuse and 
unethical conduct 
 Identify cultural taboos in a contingency environment 
 Identify the process for reporting bribery, kickbacks and other illegal acts 
Given a contingency scenario, evaluate contractor’s compliance with performance  
items and conditions 
 
CLC 222:  Online Training for COR 
This course is specifically designed for CORs who are responsible for assuring 
that contractors are performing the technical portion of their job. CLC222 will provide 
CORs the breadth of knowledge required to perform their role, including knowledge 
related to COR roles and responsibilities, as well as fundamentals of contracting 
regulations, types, phases, and other elements; awareness of ethical, legal, and cultural 
factors that impact COR responsibilities; and information necessary to effectively 
evaluate situations, apply knowledge gained, and make correct decisions to carry out 
COR responsibilities. 
Lesson one:  COR Roles and Responsibilities 
Given a contract for which you are the COR, identify the documents required by 
regulation and policy to be maintained in the COR file 
Describe the duties of the COR as outlined in the delegation letter 
Identify how potential organizational conflicts of interest can affect contract 
management 
Identify how a COR reports suspected incidents of fraud, waste and abuse and 
unethical conduct 
Lesson two:  Contract Pre-Award & Award 
 Identify market research actions of the COR 
Identify the process for developing an independent Government cost estimate 
List the requirements for preparing a statement of work or statement of objectives 
Recognize the role of the COR in the overall strategic planning of an acquisition  
Recognize the various types of funds and fiscal controls applied to contracts 
Identify the COR responsibilities in the source selection evaluation 
Identify appropriate evaluation factors/criteria 
Recognize how contract types impacts COR responsibilities 
 47 
Identify the various methods of contracting for a supply or service 
Lesson three:  Contract Management 
Recognize the basic information (period of performance, PWS, contract value) 
found in a contract to include the uniform contract format 
Identify methods of tracking contract obligations using Accounting Classification 
Requirements Number (ACRNS) and Contract Line Item Numbers 
(CLINs) in a contract 
Recognize the COR’s role in tracking the contract schedule 
Analyze contract schedule compliance, to include all SOW requirements and 
Contract Deliverable Requirements List (CDRL) deliverables 
Identify COR responsibilities supporting the planning and submission of contract 
changes documents needed to negotiate a modification 
Determine if a change is within the scope of the contract. 
Define the COR’s role in the resolution of issues under the contract and his role in 
monitoring corrective actions 
Recognize how the COR’s responsibility for providing cost estimates assist KOs 
in negotiating proposed changes in scope of work under the contract 
Identify the common causes of constructive change 
Identify the duty to provide technical clarification to the Contractor without 
creating an unauthorized obligation or constructive change to the contract 
Lesson four:  Contract Monitoring:  Performance 
Given a contract action, identify the delegated technical functions for which the 
COR is responsible 
Define the role and authority of CORs regarding past performance. 
Identify the contracting expenditures, funding issues, overruns, requests for travel 
and overtime that will be discussed with the CO 
Describe CORs responsibilities in inspecting and accepting supplies and services 
Identify major requirements for timely invoice review and payments 
Identify control and disposition requirements for government furnished or leased 
assets 
Lesson five:  Contract Monitoring:  Documentation & Handling Issues 
Recognize the requirement to safeguard data with restrictive markings. 
Identify the communications necessary among all interested parties to the contract 
as frequently as needed to ensure the services provided meet the 
established standards 
Distinguish between formal and informal communication and its effect on giving 
technical direction 
Discuss when and why schedule compliance must be brought to the attention of 
the CO 
Identify how a COR deals with non-compliance or poor performance 
Lesson six:  Special Considerations 
 Are there special considerations for services contracts? 
List the contents of a QASP)/ Performance Assessment Plan (PAP) 
In performance based contracts, identify techniques for verifying performance of 
work IAW the Government’s QASP 
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Distinguish between personal and non-personal services and act accordingly when 
working with contractor personnel 
Evaluate the contractor’s compliance with safety, security, labor, Service Contract 
Act, environmental law, and regulatory requirements 
Analyze the inspection clauses for fixed type and cost reimbursement contracts 
used in construction 
Define Earned Value Management and cost performance reporting 
Define the major actions required to evaluate the contractor’s engineering efforts 
and management systems 
 
CLM 003:  Overview of Acquisition Ethics 
This course reinforces the most important legal ethics standards governing 
interaction between government personnel and our contractors. Areas addressed include 
conflicts of interest; gratuities from contractors; the Procurement Integrity Act; job-
hunting for a position with private industry while still employed with the federal 
government; restrictions on ‘post-government employment of a former federal employee 
or officer; and ethical problems that can arise when both government and contractor 
personnel work in common spaces on common goals as a single ‘team’. 
 
Lesson one:  Gifts 
Principles to keep in mind when faced with the offer of a gift in the course 
of the job 
Lesson two:  Time Off 
Handling time off charges for a contractor employee 
Lesson three:  Test Data 
 Reporting factual data from a contractor employee 
Lesson four:  Employment 
 Offer of employment from a contractor 
Lesson five:  Nondisclosure 
 Disclosing procurement information to a contractor employee 
Lesson six:  Representation 




APPENDIX D. LIST OF GENERAL COMPETENCIES FOR COR 
Table 5. List of General Competencies for COR 
(From Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2008) 
 
General Definitions
Attention to Detail Is thorough when performing work and conscientious about attending to details
Decision-Making
Makes sound, well-informed and objective decisions; Perceives the impact and 
implications of decisions; Commits to action, even in uncertain situations, to achieve 
organizational gaols; Causes change
Flexibility
Accepts change and new information without difficulty; Adapts behavior or work 
methods in response to new information, changing conditions, or unexpected 
obstacles; Deals effectively with ambiguity.
Influencing/Persuation
Persuades others to accept recommendations, cooperate or change behavior; 
Works with others towards achieving agreement; Finds utually acceptable solutions.
Interpersonal Skills
Shows understanding, courtesy, tact, empathy; Develops and maintains 
relationships; Deals effectively with difficult people; Relates well to people from 
diverse backgrounds; Displays sensitivity to individual differences
Oral and Written 
Communication
Expresses information to people effectively; Makes clear and convincing 
presentations; Listens to others; Attends to non-verval cues; Uses correct grammar, 
punctuation, and spelling; Communicates information in a succinct and organized 
way; Considers the target audience when delivering information.
Planning and Evaluating
Organizes work, sets priorities, determines resource requirements, determines goals 
and strategies; Coordinates with other organizations; Monitors progress; Evaluates 
outcomes.
Problem Solving
Identifies problems; Determines accuracy and relevance of infromation; Uses sound 
judgment to generate and evaluate alternatives, and make recommendations
Reasoning
Identifies rules, principles or relationships that explain facts, data or other 
information; Analyzes information and makes correct interences or accurate 
conclusions.
Teamwork
Encourages and facilitates cooperation pride, trust; Fosters commitment; Works 
with others to achieve goals
Self-
Management/Initiative
Establishes well-defined and realistic goals; Displays high level of initiative, effort, 
and commitment toward completing assignments on time; Works with minimal 
supervision; Exhibits motivation to achieve; Demonstrates responsible behavior.  
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APPENDIX E. LIST OF TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES FOR 
COR 
 
Table 6. List of Technical Competencies for COR 




Contributes to maintaining the integrity of the organization; Displays high standards of 
ethical conduct; Understands impact of violating ethical standards on an organization, self, 
and others; Demonstrates trustworthiness.
Defining Government 
requirements
Makes recommendations on evaluation factors for incorporation in solicitations which tie 
back to clear and unambiguous technical requirements included in the RPF/solicitation; 




Evaluates technical aspects of contractor proposals; develops positions or strategies for 





Understands terms and conditions under assigned conract actions; expresses adequately 
roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders involved in contract administration; 
Conducts post-award orientation meetings to review contract milestones and 




Understands COR duties, responsibilities, and obligations; Adheres to limitations set forth 





Monitors contrat performance, initiates and takes necessary action to protect the interests 
and rights of the Government under contracts; Documents contractor performance in 
appropriate past-performance systems; Evaluates actual performance against contract 
objectives; Maintains a COR file in accordance with agency guidance.
Project Management
Develops and maintains a workable plan and manages resources to accomplish overall 
goal of project; Plans, manages, follows through to ensure smooth flow and timely 
completion of activities that deliver project results; Anticipates obstacles or gaps that 
would impact project success; Works to continuously improve agency's capability to 
achieve success.
Strategic Planning
Advises acquisition team members and customers in the development and implementation 




Collects and analyzes relevant market information from government and non-government 
sources; Provides business advice on the procurement requirement; Provides technical 
advice in preparation of requirements documents and related elements of the 
procurement request.  
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APPENDIX F. COR TYPE A 
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APPENDIX G. COR TYPE B 
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APPENDIX H. COR TYPE C 
(From Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2008) 
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